Malaysia and the United States: Two countries with struggling sport models

Just as other social institutions are complex systems that rely on various components and contexts to function effectively, sports are no exception

Photo by Siora Photography on Unsplash

Over the past 15 years, Malaysia’s sports performance has consistently declined. I’ve written numerous articles exploring various aspects, including coaching, administration, the Malaysian sport model, and culture. Following disappointing performances the local media often reports on significant changes in sports administration, the hiring of new coaches, or resolving conflicts within sport associations. However, these changes are rarely accompanied by action, so the downward trend persists, and the underlying reasons for this decline remain elusive.

Meanwhile, in the United States, certain sports have been experiencing the gradual disintegration of their organizational structure. As I mentioned in a previous letter, the House vs. NCAA case is perceived as an existential threat to Olympic sports that have aligned themselves with the collegiate system. Over the years it has become an integral component of performance development for certain sports, contributing to the United States’ rise as a formidable Olympic powerhouse, particularly in swimming and athletics. However, the collegiate framework for Olympic sports does not rest on a solid foundation and is vulnerable to even minor disruptions.

Sports in Malaysia and the United States are facing challenges, and practitioners in both countries are at a loss for solutions. While the issues differ, they share a common root cause: an incorrect understanding of their sport models.

The term ‘sport model’ may seem like jargon, but it accurately describes a fundamental concept: Social institutions are complex systems that rely on various components and contexts to function effectively and sports are no exception.

The strength of the United States Olympic team stems from a well-rounded model that includes various institutions such as schools, clubs, community recreation programs, colleges, and professional sports organizations. Each of these entities operates independently with its own set of rules and procedures. But despite their independence, there is an almost seamless continuity between them, albeit without official recognition.

As I’ve previously discussed, current litigation is forcing substantial changes in the collegiate sports model of the United States. In the near future, Olympic sport teams on college campuses will face significant challenges, particularly in terms of roster limitations.

Upon implementation, House will lead to an immediate reduction in the number of opportunities to participate in collegiate sports. (...) To adequately fund revenue sports under the new requirements, schools will be compelled to reevaluate the scope of their Olympic programs. Roster limits will be reduced, resulting in smaller team sizes. Moreover, unlimited scholarships will disrupt competitive parity in certain sports. Tremors from House

However, the collegiate context will persist; House directly affects only a select few Division 1 schools. But these are the same schools with the most powerful Olympic sport programs. Restricting participation there, either by imposing artificial team sizes or eliminating scholarships, will diminish opportunities for the nation’s top athletes to train in its most competitive programs.

It’s worth noting that House doesn’t impose limitations on the number or value of scholarships offered. In fact, schools can provide each athlete, up to the sport’s roster limit, a full scholarship if they choose to. This is unlikely though because schools will face new and substantial financial pressures to meet the demands of revenue-generating sports such as football and basketball, which will result in even less funding, including fewer scholarships, for Olympic programs that generate no revenue at all.

So, it’s not that Olympic sports opportunities will disappear entirely; rather, their locations and types will change. These opportunities might emerge at Division 2 or 3 schools that don’t provide scholarships or other perks that Division 1 athletes have grown accustomed to. Some athletes will welcome this change, while others may resist it. We’ll know how this unfolds in the next year or two.

I had previously discussed House and the events leading up to it, so I won’t go into the details. If you’re interested, I recommend reading the Tremors article. The central idea is that national sport governing bodies, especially those for swimming and athletics, believed that since the collegiate context has always been an integral part of their sport’s development trajectory then it would continue to be so.

Confounding this now evident miscalculation is the fact that the collegiate context has never been controlled by the sport administrators, coaches, or athletes themselves. Instead, it’s governed by entities whose main purpose has evolved into generating revenue. Olympic sports have been complicit in this arrangement. They primarily exist because of the generosity of the schools involved, rather than for any economic or strategic reason, which reveals a carefree misconception of how their sport’s model operates.

Malaysia also grapples with a ‘model’ issue in most of its sports. Malaysia adopts what I’ve described as the ‘super club’ model, where a national governing body (NGB) directs financial resources, administrative efforts, and other assets into a single, dominant program managed by the NGB. This program becomes the sport’s super club, assuming the functions of a typical sport club but with government support. It operates as a unified high-performance club, typically located in a centralized setting and is often referred to as the national team. The NGB recruits the finest athletes from across the nation and provides comprehensive support in the areas of sport science and sport medicine.

While this approach may seem like a good idea, it neglects the potential contributions of clubs across the country. Centralizing the most talented athletes in a single location removes them from the clubs that nurtured them, discourages local coaches, and diminishes the effectiveness of local training programs. In essence, a centralized super club model actually hinders national performance rather than enhancing it.

The Badminton Association of Malaysia (BAM) exemplifies a super club. Instead of fostering the development of a local club system and involving them in the management of the NGB, it selectively recruits the most talented athletes from local clubs to its centralized training facility near Kuala Lumpur. Consequently, the local clubs and coaches are left with few reasons to contribute to Malaysia’s badminton endeavors. Despite having millions of participants nationwide, the number of athletes who achieve elite-level performance is relatively small due to the centralized training scheme.

Not all Malaysian NGBs adhere to this model. For instance, football has clubs and developmental programs established across the country. By supporting a club system, which involves collaborating with a significantly larger pool of athletes and coaches, high performance can be managed more effectively.

Sport performance is influenced by various factors beyond just excellent coaching and training. The framework within which a sport operates shapes the environment where training, competition, and education occur. In the United States, the collegiate component of the Olympic development model is under stress. Continued success will depend on how NGBs adapt and evolve. Similarly, in Malaysia, some NGBs are undermining their success by disregarding local clubs. To restore Malaysia’s path to high performance, a comprehensive and inclusive approach is necessary. This means abandoning the super club strategy and recognizing that local clubs serve as the primary platform for sport development, where practical training and development take place.